Abstract-All methods for efficient integrity checking require all integrity constraints to be totally satisfied, before any update is executed. However, a certain amount of inconsistency is the rule, rather than the exception in databases. In this paper, we close the gap between theory and practice of integrity checking, i.e., between the unrealistic theoretical requirement of total integrity and the practical need for inconsistency tolerance, which we define for integrity checking methods. We show that most of them can still be used to check whether updates preserve integrity, even if the current state is inconsistent. Inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking proves beneficial both for integrity preservation and query answering. Also, we show that it is useful for view updating, repairs, schema evolution, and other applications.
Ç

INTRODUCTION
I NTEGRITY constraints are statements declared in the database schema. They express semantic properties, meant to be invariably satisfied by the stored data across state changes.
For preserving the satisfaction of simple constraints like primary keys, foreign keys, or CHECK constraints, sufficient support is usually provided by the database management system (DBMS). For constraints that are not supported by the DBMS, the majority of scientific publications on the subject proposes to use some automated, applicationindependent method for integrity checking.
Each such method takes as input the set of constraints in the schema, an update consisting of two (possibly empty) sets of database elements to be inserted or, respectively, deleted, and possibly the current, also called "old" state of the database. The output of the methods indicates whether the "new" state, obtained from updating the old state, would satisfy or violate integrity.
In theory, each method requires the total integrity of the old state, i.e., no violation whatsoever is tolerated at any time. Total integrity, however, is the exception, rather than the rule in practice.
Integrity violation may sneak into a database in many ways. For instance, new constraints may be added without being checked for violations by legacy data. Or, integrity control may be turned off temporarily, e.g., when uploading a backup for which a total check would last too long. Or, integrity may deteriorate by migrating to the DBMS of a different vendor, since the semantics of integrity constructs tends to be proprietary. Or, integrity may be compromised by the integration of databases, when constraints that had held locally fail to hold after databases have been merged.
Other database applications where inconsistencies may occur are view updating, schema evolution, data mining and warehousing, diagnosis, replication, uncertain data, and many more.
Often, users consider efforts to completely repair all inconsistencies unnecessary, inopportune, unaffordable, or impossible. Violations of constraints may even be desirable, e.g., when constraints are used to detect irregularities, such as indications of security attacks, tax dodging. So, even though the standard logic foundations are intolerant wrt. inconsistency, there is a strong practical need for integrity checking methods that are able to tolerate extant cases of constraint violations.
For convenience, we abbreviate, from now on, inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking by ITIC.
Fortunately, no new methods for ITIC have to be invented. The main purpose of this paper is to show that the gap between theory and practice of integrity checking can be closed by already approved, time-tested methods. Contrary to common belief, these methods can waive the unrealistic requirement of total integrity satisfaction, without forfeiting their capacity to check integrity, even in the presence of inconsistency. Our approach to ITIC yields major quality improvements, both of data wrt. their intended semantics and of answers to queries.
The aims pursued in this paper are the following:
1. To distinguish methods that are inconsistency-tolerant from those that are not. In this paper, we formalize the notion of ITIC. Before that, the behavior of methods for checking declaratively stated constraints in the presence of inconsistency has never been contemplated. Traditionally, integrity checking methods were not legitimized to be used in the presence of inconsistency, although many databases are not totally consistent. Now, inconsistency-tolerant methods can be soundly used in the presence of an arbitrary amount of inconsistency. Thus, the applicability of integrity checking methods is widened immensely. To the best of our knowledge, our definition is the first of its kind. 2. To bridge the gap between theory and practice of integrity checking by using inconsistency tolerance. The theoretical total-integrity requirement is a formidable desideratum in practice. Typically, practical approaches to deal with extant inconsistency are based on exception handling. They tend to have the character of workarounds or ad hoc solutions. Theoretical approaches to deal with extant inconsistency have been based on nonclassical logics, such as modal, many-valued or paraconsistent calculi. Our approach is based on classical logic and does not need any changes or adaptations of existing integrity checking methods. 3. To evaluate the effects of ITIC on database evolution and query answering. Ultimately, integrity checking is about preserving the semantics of data through updates and, consequently, obtaining query answers that can be trusted. Without total integrity, full trustability is lost. Yet, some databases may be less inconsistent than others, and thus better behaved wrt. query answering. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive set of experiments for observing the impact of ITIC on databases subject to evolution through updates. We report both on the number of constraint violations and on the number of incorrect answers to complex benchmark queries. We also compare our approach to consistent query answering [1] , which is an orthogonal technique for dealing with inconsistent data. 4. To describe several application contexts that may benefit from ITIC. The vision brought forward in this paper can be applied to various knowledge and data management problems. We show that ITIC naturally extends to view updates, database repairs, schema evolution, risk management, and unsatisfiability handling. Section 2 outlines the background. The main contributions are: to develop a concept of ITIC (Section 3), to show the inconsistency tolerance of known methods (Section 4), to outline several applications of ITIC (Section 5), and to validate the practical relevance of ITIC (Section 6). Related work is discussed in Section 7. In Section 8, we conclude.
PRELIMINARIES
We adopt the usual terminology and notation of datalog and refer to textbooks in the field (e.g., [2] ) for further background.
Logic and Databases
Throughout, let symbols a, b, . . . denote constants, p, q, . . . predicates and x, y, . . . variables. A term is either a variable or a constant. Sequences of terms are denoted as vectors, e.g.,t. Predicates, terms, logical connectives $;^; _; , 0-ary predicates true, false, and quantifiers 8, 9 are used in formulas, defined as follows: 1) If p is an n-ary predicate and t 1 ; . . . ; t n are terms, then pðt 1 ; . . . ; t n Þ is a formula. 2) If F and G are formulas, then so are $F , F^G, F _ G, F G, and F ! G. 3) If F is a formula and x a variable such that neither 8x nor 9x occurs in F , then 8xF and 9xF are formulas; in 8xF and 9xF , each occurrence of x in F is said to be bound. A formula in which all variables are bound is said to be closed. A formula preceded by $ is said to be negated. Formulas of the form pðt 1 ; . . . ; t n Þ, where p is a predicate and the t i are terms, are called atoms. A literal is either an atom (positive literal) or a negated atom (negative literal).
An expression is either a formula or a term. A substitution is a set of pairs of terms fx 1 =t 1 ; . . . ; x n =t n g, where x 1 ; . . . ; x n are distinct variables; let fx 1 ; . . . ; x n g be denoted by DomðÞ. The restriction of a substitution to a set of variables V DomðÞ is the substitution 0 such that Domð 0 Þ ¼ V. For an expression E (or a set of expressions E) and a substitu-tion , the expression E (EÞ be obtained by replacing each occurrence of each variable from DomðÞ in E (E) by the corresponding term in . An expression is called ground if it contains no variable. A substitution is more general than a substitution if there is a substitution such that, for each expression E, E ¼ ðEÞ. A substitution is a unifier of expressions E 1 ; . . . ; E n if E 1 ¼ Á Á Á ¼ E n ; is a most general unifier (mgu) of E 1 ; . . . ; E n if is more general than any other unifier of E 1 ; . . . ; E n .
A clause is a formula of the form H B 1^Á Á Á^B n (n ! 0), where H is a positive literal, B 1 ; . . . ; B n are literals and, implicitly, each variable in H B 1^Á Á Á^B n is universally quantified in front of the clause. H is called the head and B 1^Á Á Á^B n the body of the clause. The head is optional; when absent, the clause is called a denial, and its body can be read as a condition that must not hold. The empty clause is a denial with an empty body; it is equivalent to false. A fact is a clause whose head is ground and whose body is empty.
A database clause is a clause with nonempty head H 6 2 ftrue, falseg. A database is a finite set of database clauses. The dependency graph D D of a database D is a directed graph such that its nodes are labeled with the predicates in D, and there is a positive (resp., negative) arc ðp; qÞ in D D for each clause H B in D and each pair of predicates p, q such that q occurs in H and p in a positive (resp., negative) literal in B. A database D is relational if each clause in D is a fact; D is hierarchical if no cycle exists in D D , i.e., no predicate recurs on itself; D is stratified if no cycle with a negative arc exists in D D , i.e., no predicate recurs on its own negation.
An update is a bipartite finite set of clauses to be deleted and inserted, respectively. For a database D and an update U, let D U denotes the updated database; we also call D and D U the old and the new state, respectively. For a fact A in U to be inserted or deleted, we may write "insert A" or, resp., "delete A."
Integrity
We are going to formalize basic notions of database integrity.
Syntax
An integrity constraint (in short constraint) is a closed-firstorder predicate logic formula. As usual, constraints are represented either in a denials or in prenex conjunctive normal form (PCNF), i.e., formulas of the form I ¼ QI 0 , where Q is a sequence of quantified variables Q 1 x 1 . . . Q n x n , each Q i is either 8 or 9, and the so-called matrix I 0 is a conjunction of disjunctions of literals.
A variable x in a constraint I is called a global variable in I, if x is 8-quantified and 9 does not occur left of 8x in the PCNF of I. Let GlbðIÞ denote the set of global variables in I.
An integrity theory is a finite set of integrity constraints.
Semantics
We use true and false also to denote truth values. We only consider databases that have a two-valued semantics, given by a unique standard model, e.g., stratified databases with the stable model semantics [3] . That also determines the semantics of integrity, as follows: Let I be a constraint, IC an integrity theory, and D a database. We write DðIÞ ¼ true (resp., DðICÞ ¼ true) and say that I (resp., IC) is satisfied in D, if I (resp., each constraint in IC) is true in D. Else, we write DðIÞ ¼ false (resp., DðICÞ ¼ false) and say that I (resp., IC) is violated in D.
In literature, the semantics of integrity is not always defined by the truth or the falsity of constraints, as in the preceding definition. For instance, the "consistency view" in [4] defines satisfaction not by truth, but by satisfiability. The "theoremhood view" in [5] defines that a constraint is violated if it is not true, which does not necessarily mean that it is false, e.g., in the completion of databases with predicates defined by recurring on themselves. The preceding definition avoids such incongruences, as long as only databases, with a unique two-valued model, are considered.
Soundness and Completeness
Each integrity checking method M can be formalized as a function that takes as input a database, an integrity theory, and an update, and outputs either sat or vio. To compute this function, usually, is much more efficient than the bruteforce method, henceforth denoted by M bf , which exhaustively evaluates all constraints upon each update.
The soundness and completeness of integrity checking methods can now be generically defined as follows: Definition 2.1 (Sound and complete integrity checking).
An integrity checking method M is called sound or, resp., complete, if, for each database D, each integrity theory IC such that DðICÞ ¼ true, and each update U, (1), or, resp., (2) holds. 
Definition 2.1 only states soundness and completeness properties for the output sat of M. Symmetrically, soundness and completeness properties for the output vio could be defined. We refrain from doing so, since, under the additional condition that M terminates, it is easy to show that soundness and completeness for sat is equivalent to completeness and, resp., soundness for vio.
Soundness, completeness, and termination have been shown for the methods in [6] , [5] , [4] , [7] , and others. Other methods (e.g., [8] , [9] ) are only shown to be sound. Thus, they provide sufficient but not necessary conditions for guaranteeing integrity.
Simplifications
Most methods for efficient integrity checking attempt to "simplify" the constraints that are potentially violated by an update U, so that computing MðD; IC; UÞ becomes more efficient than querying all constraints by brute force. Such simplifications typically yield major gains in efficiency, as can be seen by comparing I and I 0 in Example 2.1. For any given update pattern, simplifications can be generated even without depending on any database state, but only on the schema and the integrity theory. Thus, database performance is not affected, since simplifications can be anticipated ahead of update time. For instance, take i and t in Example 2.1 as placeholders for actual ISBNs and titles. For the insertion of a concrete fact, e.g., pð17; abcÞ, values 17, and abc replace i and, resp., t in I 0 . The cost of checking the resulting simplification then is that of a table lookup, while the brute-force evaluation of I would be quadratic in the size of the extension of p (if no index is used).
INCONSISTENCY TOLERANCE
The motivation behind this paper is the need for methods that are capable of checking constraints without insisting on total integrity satisfaction. No method has ever been defined without requiring total integrity, which was thought of as indispensable. However, inconsistencies often are unavoidable, or even useful (e.g., for diagnosis, or mining fraudulent data). Thus, extant cases of violated constraints should be tolerable. Nonetheless, integrity checking should prevent that any new cases of integrity violation are introduced. That is captured by the definitions in Section 3.1.
The Main Definitions
The goal of this section is to characterize methods that can tolerate extant cases of constraint violation in databases. For attaining that goal, we first formalize what we mean by "case." 
Sufficient and Necessary Conditions
We are now going to discuss conditions that will be used for assessing the inconsistency tolerance of methods in Section 4. Conditions (5) and (6) below are sufficient for soundness (3) and, resp., completeness (4), as shown in Theorem 2. Later, (8) , which is also interesting on its own, is shown to be necessary for (4) 
Theorem 2. Let M be a sound method for integrity checking. Then, for each database D, each integrity theory IC, the implications (5) ) (3) and (6) ) (4) hold.
Proof. By applying (1), the "then" part of (5) becomes
which is the same as SðD; ICÞ SðD U ; ICÞ, hence the thesis. Similarly, applying (1) on the "if" part of (6) yields (4) . t u
In Section 4, Condition (5) is verified for the methods in [6] , [5] , [4] , and (6) is verified for [6] . Interestingly, we are going to see that many other methods turn out to not fulfill (4), since, e.g., they may output vio whenever an update yields a redundant new path for deriving some already violated case. So, if the update causes no other violation of integrity, the premise of (4) holds, but its conclusion does not. In other words, the output vio of methods that are sound but incomplete wrt. inconsistency tolerance do not guarantee that the given update would violate a case of some constraint that was satisfied in the old state. However, the following, somewhat weaker property holds for several methods:
Definition 3.3 (Weakly complete inconsistency tolerance).
Let M be a method for integrity checking. M is called weakly complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance if, for each database D, each integrity theory IC and each update U, the following holds:
The technical difference between (2) and (8) is that, for (2), total integrity of the old state is required, but not for (8) .
In practice, weak completeness wrt. inconsistency tolerance is a desirable property: The output vio of any sound, but incomplete integrity checking method, means that further checking is needed for deciding, if the update preserves or violates integrity. However, the contraposition of (8) ensures that, if a weakly complete method outputs vio, integrity surely is violated after the update, i.e., no further checking is needed. In fact, it is easy to show the following direct consequences of Definitions 2.1, 3.2, and 3.3:
Corollary 3. Let M be a method for integrity checking.
1. If M is complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance, then it is also weakly complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance ((4) ) (8)). 2. If M is weakly complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance, then it is also a complete integrity checking method ( (8) ) (2)).
ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY CHECKING METHODS
As seen in Section 3, the differences between traditional integrity checking and ITIC are quite subtle. However, it would be wrong to think that inconsistency tolerance was for free or marginal. In this section, we assess five methods to determine if they are or are not inconsistency-tolerant, spanning from the seminal work by Nicolas [6] to more recent ones. The result that many, though not all, well-known methods are inconsistency-tolerant, is of utmost practical significance, since each simplification method hitherto has been believed to be dis-capacitated, hence useless in the presence of inconsistency. To show that several methods continue to function well even if integrity is violated thus breaks radically with all expectations. Without this result, there would be no justification at all for using integrity checking methods in inconsistent databases.
We chose methods [6] , [5] , [4] due to their impact on subsequent works. In particular, [6] initiated and popularized the notion of simplification. Its extensions in [5] and [4] have generalized integrity checking to datalog. A lot more extensions have appeared. Since it is unfeasible to discuss them all, we have chosen just two more methods. (Others are analyzed in [10] .) One is from the 1990s [8] . It excels for constraints that lend themselves to optimizations related to query containment [11] . The other is from the 2000s [7] . It generates provably optimal simplifications, and generalizes previous methods that evaluate their simplifications in the old (instead of the new) state. Thus, costly rollbacks of updates that violate integrity are avoided. Table 1 summarizes the properties of the methods assessed in this section.
The Method of Nicolas
We are going to show that the well-known method for integrity checking by Nicolas [6] , henceforth denoted by M N , is sound and complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance.
We adopt the notation À þ f;I from [6] . For a database D, a constraint I ¼QI 0 in PCNF, and a fact f to be inserted, M N generates the simplification
where the i are unifiers, restricted to GlbðIÞ, of f and the m different occurrences of negated atoms in I unifying with f. Then, each occurrence of f in À þ f;I is replaced by true in À þ f;I , which is then further simplified by standard rewritings. Symmetrically, for a fact f to be deleted, a simplification obtained by instantiating I with restricted unifiers of f and nonnegated occurrences of matches of f, is generated. For simplicity, we only deal with insertions here; result and proof wrt. deletions are symmetrical.
Under the total integrity premise DðIÞ ¼ true, the simplification theorem in [6] Clearly, pði; tÞ unifies with two atoms in I, by unifiers fx=i, y=tg and fx=i, z=tg. The simplification À þ pði;tÞ;I returned by M N is 8x 8y 8z ($pði; tÞ _ $pði; zÞ _ t ¼ z) ($pði; yÞ _ $pði; tÞ _ y ¼ t). Since the two conjuncts are obviously equivalent, one of them can be dropped, yielding 8x8y ($pði; yÞ _ $pði; tÞ _ y ¼ t). Then, replacing pði; tÞ by true and dropping the corresponding disjunct yields the same simplification as in Example 2.1.
It is worth noting that each simplification step above is believed to be valid in [6] (and in fact in all the rest of the literature on integrity checking methods) only if I is satisfied in the old state. Theorem 4 rebuts this belief by confirming that the simplifications are valid, also if I is violated in the old state. 
where and are the substitutions used to compute À þ f;I and, resp., 
where is a unifier of f and a negative literal in I. Thus, one of the disjuncts in I 0 is a negated occurrence of f. Since f 6 2 D, DðCÞ ¼ true holds. Hence, (10) follows. t u
The Method of Lloyd, Sonenberg, and Topor
We are going to show that the integrity checking method in [5] , here denoted by M LST , is sound and weakly complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance. In For each derivation in the tree, each step taken in is either a standard backward-reasoning step, or a forward-reasoning step from the literal selected in the head of T or of any clause derived from T by previous steps in . In forward steps, the selected literal is resolved with a matching literal in the body of some input clause. If any such derivation yields a refutation, M SK outputs vio. If the tree is finitely failed, M SK outputs sat. Each derivation in T is replaced, if possible, by the following derivation 0 in T C . It starts from the same root as . For each i, 0 i < n, where n is the length of , the i þ 1th resolvent of 0 is obtained as follows: Suppose the jth literal of the ith clause of is selected. Then, also the jth literal in the ith clause of 0 is selected. If the i+1th input clause of is I, then C is used as input clause in 0 ; if the kth literal is selected in I, then also the kth literal is selected in C. Otherwise, the i þ 1th input clause of is also used in 0 , for obtaining the i þ 1th resolvent of 0 . Clearly, the latter is of form C iþ1 iþ1 , for some substitution iþ1 , where C iþ1 is the i þ 1th resolvent in .
At any step of 0 , it may be impossible to continue its construction by using the input clause corresponding to the one used in : either the selected literal does not match with the selected literal in the corresponding input clause in , or the latter is a denial, which cannot be used as input for T C . In both cases, 0 is discontinued, i.e., 0 then terminates with failure. It is easy to see that T C is the required finitely failed tree.
t u
We illustrate the inconsistency tolerance of M SK with an example inspired by a similar one in [12] . From the root U, M SK builds the tree as shown in Fig. 1  (selected literals are underlined) . Since this tree is finitely failed, it follows that U will not introduce new cases of inconsistency: all cases of integrity constraints that were satisfied in D, remain satisfied in D U . In particular, I 0 is also satisfied in D U .
The method M SK is not complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance, as shown by the following counterexample: Example 4.6. The constraint I ¼ lðx; yÞ^rðzÞ^x z y requires that no z in r must occur in an interval whose ends are specified by l. Suppose D ¼ flð3; 6Þ; lð5; 10Þg and U inserts lð4; 8Þ. Then, D
which essentially expresses that [4, 8] is contained in [3, 10] . 
The Method of Christiansen and Martinenghi
For an integrity theory IC and an update U, the method in [7] , here denoted by M CM , consists of the following two steps:
. First, a "presimplification" of IC for U, denoted After U ðICÞ, is computed, as described in In [7] , it is shown that M CM is both sound and complete.
Example 4.8. Let I and U be as in Example 3.2. We have After U ðfIgÞ ¼ f pðx; yÞ^pðx; zÞ^y 6 ¼ z;
Then, Optimize removes the first constraint (subsumed by I), the second (subsumed by the third), and the fourth (a tautology The M CM method is not sound wrt. inconsistency tolerance due to the behavior of Optimize, as illustrated in Example 4.9.
1. Substitutivity of ' is assumed implicitly in [7] . 
We prove (12) by transitivity of (13) and (14), below, as follows:
Evidently, (13) holds. Note now that, by Definition 4.3, After is substitutive, i.e., After U ðIÞ ¼ After U ðIÞ. Since ' is also substitutive, I 0 is obtained from After U ðIÞ by the same sequence of Optimize steps as I 0 is obtained from After U ðIÞ. Then, (14) holds because, as shown in [7] to prove soundness of M CM , the evaluation of the result of After in the old state is a sound integrity checking method, and the application of any of the steps in Optimize preserves soundness. t u
The interplay between multiple constraints also causes M CM to be not complete (not even weakly) wrt. inconsistency tolerance. This is shown by the following counterexample: 
APPLICATIONS
Inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking can improve solutions to several problems of database management. We show that for update requests in Section 5.1, for repairs in Section 5.2, for schema evolution in Section 5.3, for reliable risk management in Section 5.4, and for unsatisfiability handling in Section 5.5.
Updates are a cornerstone of each database management application addressed in this section. Each update U is required to preserve the satisfaction of a given integrity theory IC. In general, the only-if version of Corollary 10 does not hold, as shown in Example 5.1. It is easily seen that it does hold for methods that are complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance.
Example 5.1. Let p be defined by pðx; yÞ sðx; y; zÞ and pðx; yÞ qðxÞ^rðx; yÞ in a database D in which qðaÞ and rða; aÞ are the only facts that contribute to the natural join of q and r. Further, let IC ¼ f pðx; xÞg and U ¼ finsert sða; a; bÞg. Clearly, U preserves integrity, since the case C ¼ pða; aÞ is already violated in D. However, the inconsistency-tolerant methods M LST and M SK; and others generate and evaluate the simplification pða; aÞ of pðx; xÞ and thus output vio.
Inconsistency-Tolerant Satisfaction of Update Requests
We define an update request as a closed first-order formula intended to be made true by some integrity-preserving update. For a database D, an update U is said to satisfy an update request R, if D U ðRÞ ¼ true and U preserves integrity. "View update" requests are a common variant of update requests. An update method is a method to compute updates for satisfying update requests.
Similar to integrity checking, also all known update methods have traditionally postulated the total satisfaction of all constraints in the old state. However, that requirement is as unrealistic for satisfying update requests as for integrity checking. And, in fact, we are going to see that it can be abandoned just as well, for the class of methods defined as follows: Definition 5.2. An update method UM is inconsistencytolerant if each update computed by UM preserves integrity.
For an update request R and a database D, many update methods work in two phases. First, an update U such that D U ðRÞ ¼ true is computed. Then, U is checked for integrity preservation by some integrity checking method. If that check is positive, U is accepted. Else, U is rejected and another update candidate, if any, is computed and checked. Hence, the following corollary follows from Definition 5.2 and Corollary 10:
Corollary 11. Each update method that uses an inconsistencytolerant method to check its computed updates for preserving integrity is inconsistency-tolerant.
Corollary 11 serves to identify several known update methods as inconsistency-tolerant, since they use inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking methods. Among them are, e.g., the update methods in [13] , [14] , which use the integrity checking method of [5] , shown to be inconsistencytolerant in Section 4.2.
Another well-known update method, by Kakas and Mancarella, is described in [15] . For convenience, let us name it KM. It does not use any integrity checking method as a separate module, hence Corollary 11 is not applicable. However, the inconsistency tolerance of KM can be tracked down as outlined below.
For satisfying an update request, KM explores a possibly nested search space of "abductive" derivations and "consistency" derivations. Roughly, abductive derivations compute hypothetical updates of facts for satisfying a given update request; consistency derivations check these updates for integrity. Each update generated by KM consists of a bipartite set of positive and negative ground literals, corresponding to insertions and, resp., deletions of ground facts. For more details, we refer the reader to [15] . It suffices here to mention that, for KM, all constraints are represented by denials that are used as candidate input clauses in consistency derivations. Each consistency derivation of each update computed by KM corresponds to a finitely failed attempt to refute the update as inconsistent.
It is easy to verify that, for an update request R, each update U computed by KM makes R become true in D U , even if some constraint is violated in D. What is at stake is the preservation of the satisfaction of each case that is satisfied in D, while cases that are violated in D may remain violated in D U . The following theorem entails that satisfied cases are preserved by KM: even removes a violated case.
Partial Repairs
Roughly, "repairing" is to compute updates to databases with violated constraints such that the updated databases satisfy integrity. Based on cases, Definition 5.3 introduces "partial repairs." They repair only a fragment of the database.
Definition 5.3. Let D be a database, IC an integrity theory and S a set of cases of constraints in IC such that DðSÞ ¼ false.
Related notions in the literature [1] , [16] , [17] only deal with total repairs, additionally requiring them to be minimal, in some sense. In [18] , null values and a 3-valued semantics are used to "summarize" total repairs.
Repairing can be costly, if not intractable [19] . Thus, at first sight, a good heuristic to curtail inconsistency could be to use partial instead of total repairs, particularly in large databases with potentially unknown inconsistencies. However, partial repairs may not preserve integrity, as shown by the following example:
Example 5.3. Let IC ¼ f pðx; y; zÞ^$qðx; zÞ, qðx; xÞg and D ¼ fpða; b; cÞ; pðb; b; cÞ; pðc; b; cÞ; qða; cÞ; qðc; cÞg. The violated basic cases are pðb; b; cÞ^$qðb; cÞ and qðc; cÞ. Repairing f qðx; xÞg by fdelete qðc; cÞg does not preserve integrity, since pðc; b; cÞ^$qðc; cÞ is satisfied in D but not in D U . However, the partial repairs fdelete pðb; b; cÞg and finsert qðb; cÞg of IC do preserve integrity. The only subset-minimal total repairs are fdelete qðc; cÞ, delete pðb; b; cÞ, delete pðc; b; cÞg, a n d fdelete qðc; cÞ, insert qðb; cÞ, delete pðc; b; cÞg.
The dilemma that total repairs may require more update operations than partial repairs, while the latter may not preserve integrity, is relaxed by the following corollary of Corollary 10. It says that it suffices to check partial repairs for integrity preservation by an inconsistency-tolerant method. 
Inconsistency-Tolerant Schema Evolution
A database schema evolves via schema updates, i.e., removals, additions or alterations of integrity constraints or of database clauses with nonempty bodies. Since changes of the set of clauses can be captured by update requests as in Section 5.1, and deletions of constraints never cause any violation, we focus below on schema updates consisting of insertions of constraints.
Whenever a new constraint I is added to the integrity theory, it may be too costly to evaluate it on the spot, let alone to immediately repair all violated cases of I. As long as such repairs are delayed, traditional integrity checking is not applicable, since the total integrity premise does not hold. However, inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking can be used, no matter for how long the repair of violated cases is delayed.
More in IC) , the satisfaction of which is indispensable, and soft constraints (in IC 0 ), the violation of which is tolerable. Thus, by Theorem 14, each inconsistency-tolerant method guarantees that all hard constraints remain totally satisfied across updates, even if there are violated soft constraints.
Example 5.5. Let hr and lr be two predicates that model a high, resp., low risk in some application domain. Further, I 1 ¼ hrðxÞ, I 2 ¼ lrðxÞ, be a hard, resp., soft constraint for protecting against high and, resp., low risks. Then, each inconsistency-tolerant method M can be used to preserve the satisfaction of I 1 across updates, even if I 2 is violated.
Inconsistency-Tolerant Risk Management
Since constraint violations may be hidden or unknown, and since all integrity checking methods traditionally have insisted on total integrity, their use has not been reliable. But now, the definition of inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking provides a decision criterion for distinguishing reliable from unreliable methods. The unreliability of methods, that are not inconsistency-tolerant, is illustrated in the following elaboration of Example 5.5:
Example 5.6. Let D ¼ fpð0; 0Þ; pð1; 2Þ; pð2; 3Þ; pð3; 4Þ; . . .g. Further, let the predicates in IC ¼ f lrðxÞ, hrðxÞg be defined by the clauses lrðxÞ pðx; xÞ hrðxÞ pð0; xÞ; qðx; yÞ; y > th;
where lr and hr indicate a low and, resp., a high risk. In the clause defining hr, the term th may stand for a threshold value. The purpose of IC is to protect the application from any risk. Yet, in D, the low-risk presence of pð0; 0Þ is tolerated. Now, let U ¼ insert qð0; 100;000Þ. Then, methods that are not inconsistency-tolerant, such as M G , M CM , reason as follows for checking if U preserves integrity. Using U for simplifying hrðxÞ yields the case pð0; 0Þ, 100;000 > th. It is obtained from the body of the definition of hr by binding the variables x and y to 0 and, resp., 100,000, and then dropping the literal qð0; 100;000Þ. Clearly, that case is subsumed by pðx; xÞ, which defines lr and is not affected by U. The total integrity premise entails that pðx; xÞ is satisfied in D. Hence, methods that are not inconsistency-tolerant may deduce that pðx; xÞ remains satisfied in D U . From that, such methods deduce that also the subsumed constraint pð0; 0Þ, 100;000 > th, and hence hrðxÞ is satisfied in D U . Thus, even if 100;000 > th, methods such as those mentioned above accept U, i.e., they fail to detect that U causes a high risk. Thus, their output is not reliable in the presence of extant low risks. As opposed to that, if 100;000 > th, then U is reliably
Unsatisfiability-Tolerant Integrity Checking
By bad design or faulty schema updates, database evolution may lead to an unsatisfiable integrity theory, i.e., no state could ever satisfy integrity. Theoretically, unsatisfiable integrity is the worst possible situation, since each state then is irreparable. Since unsatisfiability is known to be undecidable in general, it even might never be detected. Anyway, with an unsatisfiable integrity theory, schema evolution may seem to have reached a dead end. However, inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking can be applied even if the constraints are unsatisfiable, i.e., if integrity is inevitably violated in any state. By using an inconsistency-tolerant method, one can guarantee that all satisfied cases of constraints remain satisfied, even though integrity as a whole is never attainable. Thus, each inconsistency-tolerant method is also unsatisfiabilitytolerant, as defined below. 
Corollary 15. Each inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking
method is unsatisfiability-tolerant.
Example 5.7. Let IC be the unsatisfiable integrity theory f pðx; xÞ, $pð0; 0Þ, qðxÞ^rðxÞg. Clearly, the first two denials in IC can never be satisfied at a time. However, in D ¼ fpð0; 0Þ; qð0Þ; rð0Þ; qð1Þ; rð2Þ; qð3Þ; rð4Þ; qð5Þ; . . . ; qð99Þ; rð100Þg, all basic cases of IC; except the cases pð0; 0Þ and qð0Þ^rð0Þ, are satisfied. Although IC can never be fully satisfied, it makes sense to accept updates such as deleting qð0Þ, which would actually remove a case of violated integrity, and to prevent insertions, e.g., of qð2Þ, that would introduce new violations. Also, no inconsistency-tolerant method would ever reject any request to delete any fact from q or r. Or when, e.g., the insertion of a fact of the form qðaÞ is requested, only the simplification rðaÞ will be checked, i.e., the request is rejected only if rðaÞ is in D U .
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We now describe the experiments performed for evaluating, first, the benefits of ITIC for database updating, second, its benefits for query answering, and, third, the impact of ITIC on the performance of updating, checking, and querying. Each experiment is based on a series of updates, starting from an initial state and leading to a final state. Updates are either checked by ITIC, as proposed in this paper, or not checked at all, since checking updates in inconsistent databases are traditionally considered invalid. More precisely, we run the following three kinds of experiments, the setups of which are described in Section 6.1:
. Updates may change the amount of inconsistency. In Section 6.2, we assess how inconsistency varies between initial and final states, both when ITIC is used and when integrity is not checked. We do that by measuring the percentage of tuples that participate in constraint violations. . Extant inconsistency may cause incorrect answers. In Section 6.3, we measure and compare the amounts of incorrect tuples in the answers to queries posed in the final states, both when ITIC is used and when integrity is not checked. That way, we obtain an indication of the quality of query answers depending on whether ITIC is used or not. We compute answers both by traditional query evaluation and by consistent query answering (CQA), a technique for improving the quality of query answers in the presence of inconsistency [1] . . Using ITIC obviously weighs in more on performance than running no integrity checks at all. In Section 6.4, we measure and report on the times required for integrity checking, updating and querying both, when ITIC is used and when integrity is not checked.
Parameters and Setups
The tests are run on the databases and queries of the TPC-H decision support benchmark, 2 which is known to have a broad industry-wide relevance. In order to cover a significant spectrum of update series, we have experimented with the following variants of parameter values for the initial state and the updates:
. s: initial state size. We experiment with s ¼ 100 MB, 500 MB, 1 GB, 2 GB. A database with s ¼ 2 GB has approximately 16 million tuples. . p: initial inconsistency, expressed as the percentage of tuples that participate in constraint violations in the initial state. For simplicity, we only consider primary key constraint violations. We experiment with p ¼ 0%, 1%, 10%, 33%. For example, p ¼ 10% and s ¼ 2 GB means that 1,600,000 tuples violate a primary key constraint. Violations occur when the same key value is repeated; we experiment with violations caused by 2-50 repetitions, and an equal percentage of violations in all tables. . i: percentage of insertions in the update series that violate a primary key constraint. We experiment with i ¼ 10%, 50%, 90%. We generate update series consisting of insertions and deletions of a size equal to 10 percent and, respectively, 1 percent of the size of the initial database, so as to simulate a significant evolution of the database. For example, with i ¼ 10%, and s ¼ 2 GB, there will be 160,000 insertions violating primary key constraints, i.e., 10 percent of 10 percent of 16 million tuples. (Note that deletions cannot cause any violation of primary key constraints.) The TPC-H suite provides a script, called dbgen, for generating database states of a given size that satisfy the constraints. In order to set the initial inconsistency, we use the same technique as in [20] , where the authors test their CQA approach against the TPC-H benchmark. To have, e.g., 
Measuring Inconsistency Variations through Updates
The first measurement, we have performed, assesses the inconsistency, i.e., the percentage of tuples that violate a constraint, in the final state reached after a series of updates. We denote as D NC (resp., D ITIC ) the state reached after executing on D p s the updates in U i s with no checking (resp., if accepted by an ITIC method). Both here and in the other tests, we use M N as the integrity checking method, since it is sound, complete and inconsistency-tolerant. Fig. 2 
Measuring Incorrect Tuples in Query Answers
Our second experiment tests the negative effect of inconsistency on query answering, and to which extent such effect can be cured by handling database maintenance with ITIC.
Inconsistency may be responsible for incorrect answers to queries. Let us indicate with Q D the set of tuples in the answer to query Q evaluated in database D. We define a tuple t to be a correct answer to Q in D if t 2 Q " D , where " D is the reference database of D, i.e., the state in which D would be if no inconsistency had occurred at any time. Accordingly, we define the false positives of Q in D as the set Queries that always return a fixed, very small number of results coming from complex aggregations are not wellsuited for our purposes, since even tiny variations in the state may imply different aggregate values, and thus false positives and negatives. Therefore we choose to focus on queries that return at least 10 results, namely queries Q 3 and Q 10 of the benchmark. Such queries are "top-k" queries that output the first few results of an aggregation operation.
3 Q 3 involves 3 relations, selects 4 attributes, and returns 10 results. Q 10 involves 4 relations, selects 8 attributes, and returns 20 results.
In order to compare false positives and negatives of large query answers, we also consider queries Q all 3 and Q all 10 , that we define as identical to Q 3 and, resp., Q 10 , but without being limited to the top 10 or, resp., 20 results.
Finally, we also consider the rewritings Q cqa 3 and Q cqa 10 of Q 3 and, resp., Q 10 obtained by the CQA rewriting technique described in [20] . Intuitively, CQA consists in rewriting a given query Q over a database D with an integrity theory IC into a new, more complex query Q cqa , the evaluation of which only produces the consistent answers to Q. In the definition of [1] , [20] , a tuple is a consistent answer to Q in D, if it is an answer to Q in each consistent database whose set difference wrt. D is minimal. CQA can therefore be regarded as a technique for reducing the amount of incorrect answer tuples.
We measure jQ and Q cqa 10 coincide with those to Q 3 and, resp., Q 10 ). Although slower in execution, such queries further improve the quality of answers, and in some cases they even eliminate all false positives in D ITIC . This suggests that, for quality-critical OLTP applications, where some extra time is affordable for CQA but not for total repairs, ITIC should be used for database maintenance together with CQA for query answering. When the database is too inconsistent, as, e.g., for p ¼ 33%, an update phase of 10 percent the size of the database cannot do much to significantly improve consistency, so all top answers are incorrect, both in D NC and D ITIC in Fig. 4 . 
RELATED WORK
Various forms of exception handling for dealing with persistent inconsistencies as embodied by constraint violations have been proposed in [21] , [22] , [23] , and others. However, integrity checking is not addressed in any of those works.
Another approach to deal with inconsistencies is to repair them (cf. 5.2), which, despite recent advances [18] , [17] , is known to be intractable in general. Anyway, all approaches that either eliminate or work around inconsistencies (e.g., by repairing them or treating them as exceptions) need to know about extant integrity violations. As opposed to that, ITIC simply leaves inconsistencies alone. That works reliably, even if violated cases of constraints are unknown to the user or the application, as seen in Section 5.4.
To the best of our knowledge, the putatively fundamental role alleged to total integrity as an indispensable premise for simplified integrity checking has never been challenged. That may be due to the classical ex contradictione quodlibet rule, by which conclusions derived from inconsistency cannot be considered reliable. However, in Section 5.4, we have seen that, on the contrary, the use of inconsistency-tolerant methods is fully reliable.
On the other hand, it is astonishing that total integrity has always been insisted on, since many database contexts in practice suffer from some amount of inconsistency.
Nevertheless, interesting work has been going on in recent years under the banner of "inconsistency tolerance." A lot of it is concerned with consistent query answering in inconsistent databases (abbr. CQA) [1] , [16] , [19] . CQA defines answers to be correct if they are logical consequences of each reasonably repaired state of the database, i.e., each state that satisfies integrity and differs from the given violated state in some minimal way. CQA and ITIC have in common that they neither capitulate in the presence of inconsistency (as classical logic would), nor need to appeal to repairing violated constraints (as traditional query answering and integrity checking would). However, their main purposes are different, since CQA enables query answering, while ITIC enables updating, even when the database violates integrity. Yet, integrity checking (which can be seen as a special-purpose variant of query answering) has, to the best of our knowledge, never been addressed in detail by the CQA community. As was observed in Section 6, ITIC can be considered as largely complementary to CQA, since the former prevents new integrity violations to occur during updates but does not remove the effect that extant violations may have on query answers, which is precisely what the latter does.
Also, a variety of paraconsistent logic approaches that are tolerant and robust wrt. inconsistency have received some attention, e.g., [24] , [25] . Most of them, however, deviate significantly from the syntax and semantics of classical firstorder logic, while ITIC does not. Some paraconsistent approaches resort to modal or multivalued logic. As opposed to that, ours complies with conventional twovalued semantics of databases and integrity in the literature.
Yet, resolution-based query answering (by which each of the methods mentioned in this paper has been implemented) can be characterized as a procedural form of paraconsistent reasoning [26] . This is particularly noteworthy for proof procedures that use integrity constraints as candidate input clauses, such as those in [12] , [4] . Thus, the paraconsistency of logic programming naturally qualifies it as a paradigm for implementing inconsistency-tolerant approaches to database integrity.
Further relevant work on the management of inconsistencies in databases comes from the field of inconsistency measuring [27] .
Inconsistency measures are useful for updates and integrity checking, if one wants to accept an update only if the measure of inconsistency of the old state does not increase in the new state. That, however, is precisely accomplished by ITIC, as soon as the set of violated cases of an integrity theory is measured: that set cannot be increased by an update if the update is checked by an inconsistency-tolerant method. Also other measures, such as those proposed in [27] , should be useful for determining the increase or decrease of inconsistency across updates. Alternative ways to characterize ITIC, including definitions based on inconsistency measures, are described in [10] . There, different classes of integrity checking strategies are identified, studied, and compared wrt. their inconsistency tolerance capabilities.
This paper improves and extends [28] in several ways. New are the properties and conditions for completeness and weak completeness wrt. inconsistency tolerance. Also the application of ITIC to various database management problems in Section 5 is new. Another important addition of this paper is the validation of the practical relevance of ITIC in Section 6.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of integrity checking is to ensure that the satisfaction of each constraint is preserved across updates. Traditionally, the theory of efficient integrity checking stipulates total integrity, i.e., that all constraints be satisfied in each state, without exception. In practice, however, that is an almost utopian wish.
To overcome this gap between theory and practice, we have relaxed the total integrity premise by a new requirement that tolerates inconsistency. Essentially, it asks that only those cases of constraints, that are satisfied in the old state, remain satisfied in the new state, while any amount of extant violated cases can be tolerated. (Cases are obtained from constraints by instantiating 8-quantified variables that are not governed by 9-quantified ones. ) We have seen that many (though not all) existing integrity checking methods comply with this relaxation without penalty, i.e., no change or adaptation of methods that can be shown to be inconsistency-tolerant is necessary at all. For such methods, traditional integrity checking becomes merely a special border case of our inconsistencytolerant generalization.
The main benefits of inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking (ITIC), as identified in this paper, can be summarized as follows:
1. The applicability of integrity checking methods is broadened significantly. ITIC allows updates to be fruitfully checked for integrity preservation even in the presence of inconsistency. 2. The application of ITIC tends to reduce the amount of inconsistency. In particular, ITIC guarantees that the number of violated basic cases cannot increase. Therefore, insertions cannot increase the percentage of inconsistency in the data either. 3. ITIC tends to improve the quality of answers to queries. Experimentally, we have shown that lower amounts of inconsistency obtained with ITIC typically result in lower amounts of false positives and negatives. 4. Procedural constructs for integrity maintenance can be avoided. Many applications do not comply with the demand of total integrity. Thus, instead of using methods for checking declarative constraints, application programmers often have resorted to less reliable procedural constructs, such as dynamic constraints, triggers, or stored procedures. The results of this paper now legitimize the use of methods for ITIC, since their output is reliable also in the presence of inconsistency. Future work includes further investigation of the interplay between the notion of inconsistency-tolerant repair, as introduced in Section 5.2, and CQA. Instead of referring to total repairs for answering a query, as CQA does, it should be sufficient to be content with partial repairs that tolerate inconsistencies that do not "interfere" with the query. This would also mean that CQA could even deal with unsatisfiable theories without trivializing query answers (by definition, every n-tuple is in the CQA answer to an n-ary query, if no repair exists).
Other pending work concerns inconsistency measures, as mentioned in Section 7. Acceptance of updates by an ITIC method depends on the measure in use, which, in this paper, is based on cases. Other measures may prove relevant for ITIC [10] . We also intend to investigate the capacity of inconsistency tolerance of abduction-based procedures, such as those described in [29] . Further, ongoing studies are concerned with ITIC for concurrent transactions and replicated databases.
To conclude, we believe that the notion of ITIC can be embraced by producers and vendors of DBMSs at no additional cost in most of the existing implementations. Thus, the problematic use of triggers and other nondeclarative constructs can be reduced in favor of ITIC, which is more useful and more reliable than methods that insist on total integrity. Davide Martinenghi received the MS degree in computer engineering from the Politecnico di Milano, Italy, in 1998, and the PhD degree (with a dissertation on integrity checking for deductive databases) in computer science from Roskilde University, Denmark, in 2005. He is currently an assistant professor at the Politecnico di Milano. His main research interests include data integrity maintenance, data integration, logic programming, knowledge representation, and, in a broad sense, applications of logic to databases. He is currently engaged in research on inconsistency tolerance in database systems as well as on query optimization aspects related to Web data access and Web search.
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